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The modern corporation may be described in any number of
ways. It is at the very least a legal, political, social and economic
institution. And when we speak of "corporate social responsibil-
ity," we evidence concern that the corporation might be made "re-
sponsible" from each or all of these perspectives. My purpose,
however, is not to explore the many forms that corporate responsi-
bility might take, but to comment on the subject primarily from an
economic point of view.
That the business corporation is an economic entity is hardly in
dispute. Rather the economic function of corporations is so well
established that it gives rise to the converse question: Can a well
functioning market economy also regulate corporations to achieve
social and political ends? For, as we shall see, analysis of the eco-
nomic context of corporate social responsibility (sometimes hereaf-
ter "CSR") may suggest either (1) that attempts to promote CSR
will entail unreasonably large economic costs or (2), somewhat more
modestly, that such efforts can never be demonstrated to improve
social welfare. Before taking up these issues directly, we should
spend a few moments bringing the subject matter of this essay into
sharper focus.
I. The Unruliness of Our Subject
In the world of ordinary political discourse and managerial deci-
sion-making, the concept of corporate social responsibility is rea-
sonably well understood. Interested observers immediately
comprehend the issue to be concerned with the activities of private,
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. This Commentary is
adapted from Mashaw, The Economic Context of Corporate Social Reponsibility, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 55 (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds. 1985).
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for-profit enterprises operating under market constraints that fail to
provide appropriate incentives for socially useful behavior.
Although many may be skeptical that CSR can be distinguished op-
erationally from behavior directed toward some corporate goal such
as long-term profitability, in this essay we shall assume that activities
motivated by a concern for profitability should not be characterized
as CSR. Corporate social responsibility is to be distinguished from
maximizing returns to shareholders.'
Yet to say what CSR is not is hardly to say what it is. And here
there is a rather spirited disagreement in the scholarly and polemi-
cal literature. For many, corporate social responsibility is largely, if
not exclusively, an issue of corporate compliance with social and
legal norms. 2 For others,3 the question is one of what behavior be-
yond rational, self-interested compliance with established norms-
sometimes called "voluntarism"-ought to qualify as socially re-
sponsible action. The first school of thought is primarily interested
in means, or more grandly, in the analysis of strategies of implemen-
tation; the second in ends, or more grandly still, in moral and polit-
ical theory.4
This dispute about the nature of the topic might be avoided by
pragmatically assigning it to a dustbin labeled "arid semantic quib-
bling." After all, we can imagine ourselves to have two related top-
ics that might be separately or coordinately pursued. This dispute,
however, is not merely semantic. There is a real issue here-an is-
sue concerning the province and insights of economic analysis that
is quite fundamental. Moreover, attention to this dispute reveals se-
rious limitations in the approaches of both groups of CSR theorists.
In short, my claim is that to explore the true dimensions of this con-
troversy is to describe a real debate both about the proper place of
corporate social responsibility in corporate decision-making and
about the appropriate vision of the economic and legal context
within which corporations operate.
To develop this thesis I will first give a sketch of the disputed ter-
1. See Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL'Y 303, 303-309
(1973).
2. See, e.g., Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. 1 (1980); R. NADER, M. GREEN &J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE CORPORATE GIANT
(1976).
3. See, e.g., Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-11
(1979).
4. These categories obviously oversimplify positions and group together authors,
such as Nader and Stone, who have substantial disagreements. Nevertheless, some such
heuristic is essential to make the topic manageable.
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ritory and the conflicts over economic theory that inhabit it. This
precis will unfortunately render the subject matter of the debate
even more unruly than has already been suggested. I will then turn
to a more orderly analysis of the contending positions in order to
elaborate three related arguments. First, there are perfectly good
economic arguments for CSR. Second, the type of CSR contem-
plated, the market context and the firm's legal-institutional con-
straints, combine to determine both a corporation's capacity for
CSR and the likely incidence of the costs and benefits of "responsi-
ble" behavior. This analysis, therefore, counsels caution, particular-
ity and attention to incidence effects when addressing the topic of
CSR. Third, there may be a role beyond charity and compliance for
creative corporate voluntarism in the shaping of public values, a role
that is economically feasible and politically legitimate.
In the end we will still be left with two possible subjects. But our
understanding of them will have changed and they will no longer
seem so compatible as a joint project. Indeed, corporate social re-
sponsibility will be revealed as a topic that might inhabit two entirely
different realms of intellectual discourse and take on radically differ-
ent meanings in each.
II. A Sketch of the Real Dispute
For present purposes I shall divide the corporate social responsi-
bility debaters into two general camps, "compliance critics" and
"voluntarist apologists." These noms deguerre suggest attitudes both
toward the definition of the subject matter of the debate and toward
the acceptability of the contemporary practices of corporations.
Compliance critics view compliance with established norms as the
chief CSR battleground and are critical of the corporate perform-
ance. Voluntarist apologists, on the other hand, tend to view volun-
tarism (action beyond simple compliance) as the only true CSR and
are generally apologists for corporate conduct oriented exclusively to-
wards profit maximization.
While we cannot here canvass the whole of the debate, the con-
crete issue of corporate behavior that seems most clearly to separate
compliance critics from voluntarist apologists is their respective an-
swers to the question: "Should corporations comply fully with es-
tablished legal norms?" Compliance critics answer emphatically,
"Yes!" They usually view the desirability of perfect compliance with
legal norms as non-problematic. For them, it is simply too clear for




tates of environmental protection, product safety, anti-fraud, anti-
monopoly and other laws-the governing political expressions of
social consensus. Failure to comply is, for these analysts, a failure in
social responsibility. Indeed, the belief that such failures are fairly
widespread poses strategic problems of effective enforcement with
which compliance critics are most intensely concerned. 5
While generally agreeing that legal norms represent social con-
sensus, voluntarist apologists attack the compliance critics' position
from two directions. One form of voluntarist, whom I will call the
"moderate apologist," notes that the behavioral signals provided by
legislation, regulations and common law rules are not exhausted by
the language of their legal standards of conduct. 6 These norms also
contain sanctions attached to malfeasance. Moreover, the extent
and effectiveness of those sanctions are determined by the institu-
tional machinery provided for their implementation. If one takes all
of these factors into account, it becomes clear that each norm im-
plicitly describes some finite expected social cost from some particu-
lar form of proscribed conduct. 7 If the corporation's expected
return from the proscribed activity exceeds this social cost, then to-
tal social welfare will be enhanced by engaging in the activity. Obey-
ing the law under those conditions is surely not a moral duty and
might be viewed as socially irresponsible.
The moderate apologist then may easily demonstrate that corpo-
rate behavior which seeks directly to promote social welfare by ob-
serving canons of common morality cannot be known to be socially
responsible.8 In other words, if the appropriateness of compliance
with law involves a complex calculation of explicit and implicit be-
havioral signals concerning the social value of compliance, then the
attempt to make such a calculation in the absence of such signals
must move from the difficult to the impossible. From this perspec-
5. See generally C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975). This is not to say, however,
that conformity to law wholly exhausts the compliance critics' interest in corporate social
responsibility. This position also includes an interest in corporate compliance with no-
tions of common morality, deceny or good citizenship that may not be captured by legal
rules. Thus, for example, the compliance critic will probably view corporations as hav-
ing obligations to maintain the social and economic infrastructure of their host commu-
nities, or to promote the long-term well being of their work forces, going well beyond
the specific requirements of legal rules. See, e.g., Schwartz, Towards New Coporoate Goals:
Co-existence With Society, 60 GEO. L. J. 57 (1971).
6. See Engel, supra note 3, at 37-55.
7. On the economic theory of criminal law, see generally, Klevorick, On the Economic
Theory of Crime, XXVII NoMos (forthcoming); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff
between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979) and authorities
there cited.
8. See Engel, supra note 3, at 55.
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tive, the silence of authoritative political institutions, e.g., the ab-
sence of governing legal norms, must be viewed either as a signal to
maximize expected returns or as no signal at all.
The "radical apologist" goes somewhat further. She will, of
course, agree with the basic compliance calculus put forward by the
moderate apologist, but not with the social welfare rationale for its
use. Instead, the radical apologist will insist that only this calculation
is consistent with the survival of the firm. Under competitive condi-
tions, compliance costs in excess of the expected value of the so-
cially imposed sanctions will cause the firm to become unprofitable
and, ultimately, to disappear. As then Professor, now Judge, Posner
pithily put the point, "a sustained commitment to any goal other
than profitability will lead to bankruptcy, unless collusion is
permitted." 9
Although the moderate and radical apologists' positions permit
the same "profitable nastiness," the compliance critic may be ex-
pected to confront their arguments in different ways. She will take
the moderate apologist to task for extending economic calculation
to an inappropriate domain. The question of corporate social re-
sponsibility, the compliance critic will argue, is a question about
civic virtue; answers cannot be provided solely by an economic anal-
ysis of the incentive structure established by the current state of the
positive law and by the institutional limits on its implementation.
The compliance critic will join issue with the radical apologist, how-
ever, not on the question of the the appropriate domain of the eco-
nomic analysis, but on the question of the appropriate theoretical
approach to the analysis of economic activity. Surely, the critic will
argue, the radical apologist must abandon the image of optimizing
calculations in perfectly competitive markets. Once imperfect mar-
kets are acknowledged, we must consider the possibility of a range
of discretionary actions, including actions that can be characterized
as exercising social responsibility and which do not threaten the via-
bility of the firm.' 0
I agree with the overall conclusions of our hypothetical compli-
ance critic. That is to say, I believe both that corporate social re-
sponsibility is economically possible and that it is conceptually
9. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 310-11 (1977).
10. The degree of managerial discretion available is variously described. Professor
Manne, for example, suggests that the limit is set by the costs that would have to be
borne by non-altruistic managers in gaining control of the firm and ending profit-erod-





intelligible within a framework of economic analysis. But the argu-
ments against the radical and moderate apologists are not so easy as
our critic seems to imagine. Nor, as we will see, do they necessarily
lead in the directions that the critic seems to contemplate. But first
we must undertake a more careful evaluation of radical and moder-
ate economic apologetics.
III. The Market Structure of Corporate Social Responsibility
When the radical apologist invokes the iron discipline of competi-
tive markets as a bar to corporate social responsibility of all types,
she paints a picture of market structure that is likely to be dismissed
as unrealistic. Yet we must again be wary of proceeding too quickly.
It is instructive to consider the means by which the socially responsi-
ble firm might be "selected out" in such markets. Those selection
mechanisms illuminate the likely distributional effects of CSR (the
incidence of what we might call the "corporate social responsibility
tax") and the comparative difficulty of inducing voluntarist corpo-
rate activity across various sectors of the economy.
Market discipline converges on the firm through at least three
markets-product markets, capital markets and labor markets. If we
assume that all of these markets are competitive, the individual firm
faces precisely the same marginal cost function as its competitors
and a highly elastic demand function for its products. When it en-
gages in CSR, it must therefore either raise its prices and face a
drastic decline in demand for its products, or it must reduce the
returns to capital or labor. Reductions in the returns to either will,
over time, cause the firm to fail to attract the necessary financing
and talent to survive in the marketplace. This is the logic of the
neoclassical model of competitive markets.
We know, of course, that real world situations are different. Yet
the ideal form is a useful heuristic. It tells us first that a firm must
have some market power to engage in CSR. Firms operating in
highly competitive markets will not be able to engage in much CSR
and still prosper. To urge corporate social responsibility is, there-
fore, to urge either that it should be the model for those firms that
have the power to engage in CSR ("selective CSR") or to urge that
some program of structural reform be instituted to render markets
selectively non-competitive when CSR activity is desired ("global
CSR"). Because selective CSR is probably much easier to orches-
trate than global CSR, we should, if we are to be reasonable and
fair, expect more CSR from the stable monopoly than from the firm
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in a highly competitive field. Casual comparison of the philan-
thropic activities of quasi-monopolies (e.g., AT&T or IBM) and of
discount consumer goods stores (e.g., the late lamented W. T.
Grant Co. or Woolco) suggests that in practice we do tend to get
more CSR from the former than the latter. Attention to economic
context thus reveals that demands for corporate social responsibility
should probably be disaggregated to acknowledge differing market
structures.
The further lessons to be drawn from refuting the radical apolo-
gist are even more interesting. If market power is a necessary condi-
tion for CSR, and the firm's demand and cost functions are
determined by the operation of three different markets, then in
principle its market power might be the result of a favorable posi-
tion in any one or any combination of those markets. Moreover, the
costs of CSR must fall upon markets in which the firm has market
power in order to avoid the perfect competition result-the disap-
pearance of the firm. This analysis of the incidence of CSR costs,
however, is correct only under certain conditions. "
Thus, to understand the effects of market discipline on CSR and
to analyze CSR's distributional effect we must distinguish several sit-
uations. In what I will call "the standard case" of CSR-for exam-
ple, a firm with some market power in product markets which
decides to make a gift of corporate real property to the local com-
munity or to make a one-time purchase of capital equipment in or-
der to comply fully with only partially enforceable health or safety
regulations-the CSR costs (loss of net profits) will fall wholly upon
existing shareholders. Presumably the price of the firm's products
has already been set to maximize profits. An attempt to raise the
price of the firm's products to recapture CSR costs will, therefore,
only reduce profits. A similar analysis applies to the case of a firm
engaging in the same type of CSR whose market power is in the
labor market. Further reductions in wages will reduce productivity
and thereby reduce profits.
The loss of net profits need not be "taxed" to existing equity
holders in the standard case. If they purchased their shares with
rational expectations concerning CSR conducted by the firm, then
the price they paid reflected the expected loss. In that case the loss
is borne by prior shareholders, perhaps the founders of the enter-
11. Cf. Calabresi, Comment, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 57, 58




prise. Nevertheless, the incidence of the costs of CSR will be on
equity shareholders rather than on workers or consumers.
This incidence analysis of the standard case raises a question of
potential concern: Are we disturbed by the possibility that firm
managers may be able through CSR to further such causes as the
arts, environmental protection or local recreation opportunity while
charging the costs to the firm's equity holders? To answer "yes,"
we must assume two things, at a minimum. First, we must assume
that agency costs are positive- that is, that managers will not spend
firm profits on CSR in precisely the way equity holders would have
spent them. 12 Second, we must assume that the costs of replacing
management by proxy contests or takeovers are sufficient to render
the situation non-self-correcting.
I suspect that our concern about managerial discretion in CSR
expenditures may increase as both the divergence between manage-
rial and shareholder tastes and the transaction costs of policing
managerial behavior increase. This concern may involve simple dis-
taste at the prospect of X spending what is ostensibly Y's money. It
may also reflect a concern about appropriate incentives. Assuming
that both management and equity holders are generally motivated
towards increasing social welfare by engaging in altruistic activity,
we should still prefer that decisions about what promotes social wel-
fare be disciplined by the decision-makers' bearing the costs of the
decisions. 13
Notwithstanding concern about agency costs, economies of scale
in CSR might cause us to distinguish between types of CSR when
making proposals to curb managerial discretion. Where responsible
behavior could be engaged in as easily by agents and equity holders
as by the firm (gifts to charity, for example) we might want to re-
strain, or at least be cautious about advocating, managerially di-
rected firm behavior of that sort. On the other hand, there are
clearly other types of responsible behavior (pollution control, work-
place safety, or the like) which would be very difficult to promote by
"cashing out" the costs through managers' salaries or returns to eq-
12. For a general formulation of the theory of the firm as a response to agency costs,
see Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
13. These reflections suggest several implications that will not, for present purposes,
be carried any further. First, the closely held firm, where equity holders control deci-
sion-making, poses no problems for CSR that distinguish it from individual social re-
sponsibility. Second, what we have called the "standard case" relies on some
imperfections in capital markets as well as in product markets.
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uity holders. Here we may be prepared to advocate firm action de-
spite the presence of non-trivial agency costs.
As the utilization of the standard case terminology suggests, there
are also non-standard cases-that is, situations where the CSR tax
will fall on consumers or workers. A straightforward example of a
CSR tax on consumers might be a regulated monopoly such as a
public utility. If we assume that rate regulation is somewhat effec-
tive so that the monopoly price is not being charged, and that the
regulators are prepared to treat many activities of the CSR type as a
cost of doing business (voluntary full compliance with health, safety
and other regulations, for example), then consumers will bear the
costs of CSR. Rising CSR costs will generate a demand for in-
creased rates to maintain the firm's return on investment. With
some lag time, the regulator will grant those increases, thus passing
along the increased CSR costs to the ratepayers.
Similarly, labor will pay CSR costs where the behavior involved
acts like a payroll tax (for example, the provision of personal safety
equipment) or where production declines, thereby reducing the de-
mand for labor (for example, a reduction in highway truck speeds
on routes where rail lines are close competitors). More accurately,
labor will bear these CSR costs where the firm has some monopsony
power with respect to labor and faces relatively competitive markets
for products and capital. Indeed, the non-standard cases suggest
that the incidence of the CSR tax will vary with both the type of CSR
engaged in and with its market and institutional context.
What implications should we draw from the preceding analysis?
The most basic point is obvious and important: Relaxing the per-
fect competition assumption refutes the radical apologists' notion
that no CSR is possible, but it simultaneously challenges the notion
that all CSR is desirable. If we are concerned at all about the distri-
butional effects of CSR, we must be cautious. General support of all
varieties of CSR in all contexts, letting the costs fall on investors,
consumers or employees as they might, would only by chance satisfy
my definition of a fair tax (a proportional tax on equal incomes or a
graduated tax on unequal incomes). For this result to occur, we
would at least have to assume that capital holdings were widely dis-
tributed, and that CSR includes a broad range of activities produc-
ing either pure public goods or benefits available on an equal basis
to virtually everyone. To state the proposition in this way is to sug-




incidence of global CSR costs are, like the conditions for perfect
competition, unlikely to exist.
Particular cases may suggest a wide range of unfair outcomes.
Imagine a regulated utility whose stock is held by middle to upper
income investors, which is also a major employer in local labor mar-
kets and which is allowed high returns on a product marketed
predominantly to lower and lower-middle income consumers. (A
telephone operating company may be a good example, especially if
one thinks about "pay" or coin-operated telephone charges.) Now
imagine that this firm's idea of socially responsible conduct is to
support entertainment on the stage and on public television that is
viewed almost exclusively by upper-income persons. The distribu-
tional effects in this example seem perverse indeed.
Note, however, that this and other examples are not arguments
against CSR. We might be just as concerned with the distribution
effected by the market and institutional processes described in our
hypothetical if the firm engaged in no voluntarist activities. These
arguments do, however, set an agenda for serious inquiry into the
types of CSR that we might feel comfortable advocating under dif-
fering market and institutional conditions. That agenda should in-
clude questions both about the current structure of CSR (e.g., Who
pays? Who benefits? What alternative distributional arrangements
tend to augment or offset the existing CSR incidence pattern?) and
about the distributional implications of various strategies for rede-
signing the decision structures of particular corporations (e.g.,
Whose interest will outside directors promote? What would it mean
to attend to or represent consumer interests in corporate volunta-
rism? How much CSR should reflect local employee versus con-
sumer or management preferences?). This is clearly an agenda of
very tough questions.' 4
IV. The Search for Social Welfare
It is at this point in the discussion that the moderate apologist
enters the fray. For it is precisely the messiness of CSR decision-
making that gives the moderate apologists' arguments their persua-
sive force. Why should we imagine that private firms are capable of
14. Because the incidence questions involve general equilibrium analysis (see, e.g.,
Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons From Incidence
Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1975)) and the design issues confront a host of organiza-
tional imponderables (see, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, DESIGNING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
(1973)), answers to our inquiries are likely to be both messy and disputable.
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discerning appropriate social goals beyond those society has given
them incentives to pursue?
The moderate apologists' argument is, you will remember, basi-
cally a claim that corporations should respond precisely to the in-
centive system that the law, in action, provides as a behavioral guide.
The only exceptions recognized to this profit-maximizing calcula-
tion might be (1) disclosure of non-complying conduct so that soci-
ety's decisions concerning legal norms and the resources devoted to
their enforcement can be based on a correct understanding of the
level of non-compliance' 5 and (2) an occasional voluntarist action in
the face of social emergencies that cannot have been captured in
legal norms, provided that the proposed actions have very clear and
lop-sided benefit-cost ratios.' 6 Of course, these are only possible
exceptions. After all, legal reporting requirements might deal with
disclosure problems, and the social failure to provide for emergen-
cies may be a social recognition that providing against some low
probability events is simply not worth the cost. Thus, the commit-
ted moderate apologist might insist that corporations observed to
be incurring compliance costs in excess of the nominal value of legal
sanctions discounted by the probability of their assessment, or pro-
viding non-compelled disclosure of their illegal behavior, or engag-
ing in other "good Samaritan" acts, while not necessarily
blameworthy, could not claim with certainty that they were fulfilling
a socially prescribed responsibility.
As noted earlier, it is tempting to confront this argument with the
claim that the moderate apologist has inappropriately transferred
the economic vision of rational action in markets to the domain of
moral behavior in society. Like a naive physicist searching for sub-
atomic particles with a magnifying glass, the moderate apologist is
led to deny the existence of modes of thought and behavior that the
methodology of economic analysis obscures from view. In some
sense it may be inconsistent for society to provide a structure of
legal rules and institutions that limits both sanctions and implemen-
tation resources, and at the same time to affirm the notion that no
criminal or tortious conduct is socially approved. Yet this is surely
what society does. 17 If economic analysis cannot explain the appar-
ent contradiction, this merely demonstrates a limitation of economic
15. Engel, supra note 3, at 70-84.
16. Id. at 59-69.




analysis, not the absence of a domain of moral social action beyond
the existing structure of legal incentives.
This answer is tempting because it is succinct and plausible.
Many will find it convincing. Yet I am troubled by the sorts of re-
sponses that the moderate apologist might offer. Those responses
are of at least three types. First, it is simply not the case that society
wants to prevent the occurrence of all of the conduct covered by any
civil and criminal liability rule. A moment's reflection will tell us
that we do not want corporations to establish the enormously, per-
haps infinitely, costly and complex monitoring systems that would
be required to insure that none of their employees ever fails to make
an accurate measurement of the quality of the firm's effluent. And if
that is the case, then we as a society do not want perfect compliance
with environmental regulations or other legal rules. The question
then becomes: "How much compliance do we want?" The best can-
didate for a socially accepted standard, the moderate apologist
would argue, is how costly we in fact make the failure to provide
accurate monitoring of environmental quality. Indeed, there is no
other obvious candidate once perfect compliance is appropriately
put to one side.
Second, really a generalization of the first, there is no reason to
believe that talk about what behavior is socially acceptable reflects
real preferences. People constantly behave differently than they
talk. If one wants to know what they really prefer, one should ob-
serve their behavior. The social behavior that moderate apologists
observe is precisely the set of limited penalties and institutional con-
straints on enforcement that yields a finite social disvalue for
breaches of legal rules. True, people sometimes behave collectively
as if life were infinitely precious and the level of social expense nec-
essary for its protection were no object. But these cases are rare.
While they affirm the sanctity of human life, they also highlight the
fact that as a society we do not always act as if life were infinitely
precious.' Such cases surely cannot be extended to the run-of-the-
mill legal rule nor can they be generalized to provide a standard of
socially responsible behavior, even for all those situations when
human life is potentially at stake.
Finally, it is not clear how far one can apply explicitly non-eco-
nomic, moral considerations to corporations and their behavior.
Corporations are economic entities. Moreover, they are legal fic-
tions. As the prior discussion of labor, capital and product markets
18. See id. at 39.
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suggests, the firm is simply a nexus of converging contracts between
and among workers, investors and consumers.' 9 If the theory of
corporate social responsibility is a theory about moral action, to
what or to whom is the capacity for moral action being ascribed?
As is plain from the nature of these arguments, the debate be-
tween the compliance critic and the moderate apologist is just
warming up. It threatens to move quickly into metaphysical realms
(What counts as an observation of human behavior for purposes of
social science? What are the necessary conditions for moral ascrip-
tion or moral agency?) in the search for some common starting
point from which fruitful discussion might proceed. As interesting
(or tedious) as those issues might be, I prefer to imagine the compli-
ance critic switching at this juncture to a more immediate common
ground with the moderate apologist. For the compliance critic may
certainly suggest that economic analysis, while useful and appropri-
ate, fails to lead in the direction that the moderate apologist has
suggested.
A. The Economics of Self-Control
The basic problem with the apologist's prior arguments is that
they are not very attentive to the question of how society might de-
termine the level at which to set either legal penalties or budgets for
enforcement. From an economic perspective, those levels would
presumably be set to maximize the value of "good" behavior less
error costs and administrative costs. Given that these latter two
costs are surely positive, there is some area of bad (good) action
society would prefer to eliminate (promote) but cannot, at least not
while preserving welfare levels, unless those costs can be reduced.
The search for institutional forms that promote self-application of
legal norms, that is, the attempt to increase the compliance compo-
nent of corporate social responsibility, may be viewed as a search for
exactly such techniques of cost reduction. CSR is, in this view, part
of the ongoing process of constructing a more efficient legal system.
Indeed, a campaign to induce compliance through various struc-
tural reforms (outside or public directors, CSR audits, and the like)
may have significant efficiency payoffs. Many of the offenses that
concern compliance theorists (fraud, bribery or price-fixing, for ex-
ample) are criminal offenses requiring proof of various degrees of
intent. In these circumstances, enforcement errors are most likely
and most costly. Therefore, we provide an extremely expensive ad-




ministrative machinery, the criminal justice system, to guard against
incurring those even more expensive error costs. Self-application of
these sorts of criminal and even non-criminal norms would avoid
implementation errors without incurring the vast expense of litiga-
tion. Indeed, it may be the case that we will be able to preserve the
fairness values that the criminal trial affirms only if self-application
is the norm. In short, where altruistic self-application is more effi-
cient than modifying the expected value of sanctions, there is a
straightforward efficiency argument for seeking to increase volun-
tary compliance (CSR).
The apologist may object that structural reform in the decision-
making apparatus of firms, indeed any increased attention to com-
pliance questions, is itself costly. But this objection, abstractly con-
sidered, is not very telling. Compliance critics are quite prepared to
debate the issue of the comparative efficacy, and perhaps even the
comparative efficiency, of various means for increasing CSR. More-
over, for all we know, those techniques may be sufficiently inexpen-
sive so that compliance very close to perfection would
unambiguously increase net social welfare in at least some cases.
Whether that is true will, of course, depend on a wide range of
contingencies, including the type of norm involved, firm size, mar-
ket conditions, available organization strategies and perhaps a host
of other factors. Nevertheless, the central point remains. There is
here defined an economic context, an analytic framework, within
which the compliance critic's means-oriented institutional analysis
of CSR makes perfect economic sense. From this more fully devel-
oped economic perspective, corporate social responsibility is
neither as imponderable nor as irrelevant as the moderate apologist
suggested it might be.
Yet even if forced to admit that there is potentially a substantial
arena for voluntary compliance with legal norms, the moderate
apologist may yet object that it is highly unlikely that firms will cor-
rectly discern the course of action that will maximize social welfare
in the absence of a governing legal norm. Surely here, "maximize
profits" is the program society must be presumed to wish the corpo-
ration to pursue. This is indeed a substantial objection to genera-
lized calls for corporate social responsibility that go beyond full
compliance with the law. But it is not necessarily a determinative
objection. One way to get around it is to alter our view of the social
meaning of legal norms.
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B. The World of Social Choice
Suppose one imagines politics, not as a black box producing so-
cial welfare directives, but as an arena in which self-interested actors
seek to further their own ends. The suggestion, in short, is to move
from the political economy of Kaldor, Hicks and Pigou to the polit-
ical economy of Arrow and Stigler and Condorcet.20 In that latter
intellectual world, we would have to view legal rules quite differently
than we have viewed them to this point. Whether we then view legal
norms as agenda artifacts or as pay-offs to powerful special interests,
such rules of conduct would only by chance represent any social
consensus. In this world, the probability that any particular legal
norm adopted by political institutions will enhance social welfare is
greatly diminished.
Movement from the world of social welfare to the world of social
choice is indeed a shift in perspective of Copernican proportions.
We cannot here begin to discuss the plausibility of viewing politics
in this way or trace the many implications of the social choice per-
spective for the topic of corporate social responsibility. Yet one im-
plication demands at least superficial attention: The public welfare
world has been the common habitat of both voluntarist apologists
and compliance critics. If we acknowledge this, then there would
seem to be an opportunity for reciprocal petard-hoisting.
For example, if laws are viewed merely as the outcome of self-
interested, competitive struggle within political institutions, then
the apologist's objection that firms cannot discern social welfare
outside the structure of existing legal rules loses much of its force.
Firms should be no worse at pursuing social welfare unaided than
when confined by a set of legal norms whose social welfare purposes
and consequences are unknown. The radical indeterminacy of the
social welfare consequences of collective choices relieves the private
firm of its comparative incompetence to define as well as pursue so-
cial aims.
So far so good for the compliance critic. But if social welfare as
the basis for legal norms vanishes for the apologist, it vanishes for
the critic as well. For the compliance critic, this movement is even
more devastating. In a social choice world, compliance with pre-
established social norms could not be viewed coherently as a defin-
ing characteristic of corporate social responsibility. The paradig-
matic case of socially responsible corporate behavior might more




plausibly be conceptualized as creative action leading toward in-
dependent or communal moral definition. Moreover, if this is the
nature of corporate social responsibility, then there is no reason to
believe that the compliance-oriented institutional means of enhanc-
ing CSR which populate the compliance critics' reform proposals
would even be relevant, much less functional, to the tasks that lie
ahead.
V. Conclusion
The preceding exploration of the attitudes of "compliance critics"
and "voluntarist apologists" towards corporate social responsibility
shows that, at least from one perspective, the controversy over the
appropriate place for CSR in corporate decision-making is more
than just a "semantic quibble." While compliance critics can show
that CSR is economically possible and justifiable, their antagonists
can also demonstrate that CSR is not socially beneficial under all
conditions or in every situation. Thus, economic context must be
explored in considerable detail in every case in order to develop an
appropriate framework for means-oriented institutional analysis of
CSR. Socially responsible argument for corporate social responsi-
bility is hard work.
If one moves to the world of social choice, however, the impor-
tance of the means-oriented CSR debate diminishes. Yet, far from
reducing the broader controversy over CSR to a mere quibble, this
move transforms the intellectual task from the merely difficult to the
almost unimaginable. For the social choice perspective may require
radically novel economic and political frameworks within which to
judge corporate social responsibility.
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